Continuous game

Results: 96



#Item
41Repeated Games with Frequent Signals  Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2008-06-02 12:42:51
42Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

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Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41
43HKU CS Tech Report TR[removed]Real-Time Continuous Collision Detection for Moving Ellipsoids under Affine Deformation §

HKU CS Tech Report TR[removed]Real-Time Continuous Collision Detection for Moving Ellipsoids under Affine Deformation §

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Source URL: www.cs.hku.hk

Language: English - Date: 2006-04-24 21:53:17
44Using matrix algebra in linear regression  Jackie Nicholas Mathematics Learning Centre University of Sydney

Using matrix algebra in linear regression Jackie Nicholas Mathematics Learning Centre University of Sydney

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Source URL: sydney.edu.au

Language: English - Date: 2010-07-20 01:55:28
45Fitness & Training Ready for the Game Senior Rugby League players can cover over 8 km in a single game, from walking, to jogging, to running backwards and sideways, to sprinting. Players need to be gradually exposed to t

Fitness & Training Ready for the Game Senior Rugby League players can cover over 8 km in a single game, from walking, to jogging, to running backwards and sideways, to sprinting. Players need to be gradually exposed to t

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Source URL: www.nzrl.co.nz

Language: English - Date: 2013-08-22 23:48:56
46Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41
47Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000

Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2000-05-10 11:49:25
48Repeated Games with Frequent Signals  Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007

Repeated Games with Frequent Signals Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: February 6, 2007

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-06-02 12:42:51
49Adoption of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulation is emerging as a game changer for continuous manufacturing applied to Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).

Adoption of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) simulation is emerging as a game changer for continuous manufacturing applied to Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).

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Source URL: www.cd-adapco.com

Language: English - Date: 2013-02-01 16:10:32
50Optimal Contracting and Nash Equilibria in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Multiple Principals Mark Schroder, Lening Kang and Shlomo Levental Michigan State University

Optimal Contracting and Nash Equilibria in the Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problem with Multiple Principals Mark Schroder, Lening Kang and Shlomo Levental Michigan State University

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Source URL: www.fields.utoronto.ca

Language: English - Date: 2010-06-21 11:38:31